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Abstract
The total amount of cost overruns for any 
construction project can be fully determined 
once the project is completed. Estimating the 
amount of cost overruns at different stages of 
ongoing construction projects is important for 
project success. There is, however, a dearth of 
research for this exercise. This article reports the 
results of an investigative study on cost overruns 
for ongoing building projects in Abuja. The 
quantitative technique was adopted in this study. 
The investigation included ongoing building-
construction projects within Abuja, from which 
a sample of 30 building projects (public and 
private) was purposively selected (project value 
of ZAR100 million and above). The data were 
sourced from the archival records (drawings, 
bills of quantities, project progress reports, and 
specifications) on the issues relating to the costs 
and duration of building projects. The data were 
analysed using descriptive (percentages) and 
inferential methods. The results revealed that 
the percentage of cost overruns ranged from a 
minimum of 5.56% with 90% project completion, 
and within 88% of the estimated time limit, to 
a maximum of 216.08% with merely 5% project 
completion, and within 8.3% of the estimated 
time limit. The entire projects had average 
cost overruns of 44.46%, with an average 
project completion of 52.4%, and within 91.4% 
of the average estimated time limit. Based 
on these findings, it can be concluded that 
continuous investigation into, and analyses 
of cost overruns at stages of building projects 
would encourage professionals to apply the 
best mitigation measures, in order to achieve 
a significant reduction in the total cost overrun 
at the completion of a project. Construction 
professionals should be well informed of these 
consequences (cost overruns) at an early stage, 
in order to evaluate the extent to which these 
consequences could be minimised.
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Abstrak
Die totale koste-oorskryding van enige konstruksieprojek kan ten volle bepaal 
word nadat die projek voltooi is. Koste-oorskrydingberamings op verskillende 
stadiums van deurlopende konstruksieprojekte is belangrik vir ’n projek se sukses; 
maar daar is gebrekkige navorsing daaroor. Hierdie artikel gee die resultate 
van ’n ondersoek oor koste-oorskryding van voortgesette bouprojekte in Abuja. 
Die kwantitatiewe navorsingmetode is in hierdie studie gebruik. Die ondersoek 
sluit deurlopende bouprojekte binne Abuja in, waaruit ’n steekproef van 30 
(openbare en private) bouprojekte doelgerig geselekteer is (projekwaarde 
van ZAR100 miljoen en hoër). Die data is verkry uit die argiefrekords (tekeninge, 
wetsontwerpe van hoeveelhede, projek-vorderingsverslae en spesifikasies) oor 
die kwessies wat verband hou met die koste en duur van bouprojekte. Die data 
is ontleed met behulp van beskrywende (persentasies) en inferensiële metodes. 
Die resultate het getoon dat die persentasie van koste-oorskryding gewissel het 
van ’n minimum van 5.56% met 90% projekvoltooiing, en binne 88% van die 
beraamde tydslimiet, tot ’n maksimum van 216.08% met net 5% projekvoltooiing, 
en binne 8.3% van die beraamde tydslimiet. Die hele projek het ’n gemiddelde 
koste-oorskryding van 44.46% met ’n gemiddelde projekvoltooiing van 52.4%, 
en binne 91.4% van die gemiddelde geskatte tydslimiet gehad. Op grond van 
hierdie bevindinge, kan daar afgelei word dat deurlopende ondersoek en 
ontleding van koste-oorskryding by stadiums van bouprojekte professionele 
persone sal aanmoedig om die beste versagtingsmaatreëls toe te pas, ten 
einde ’n aansienlike vermindering in die totale koste-oorskryding op die 
voltooiing van ’n projek te bereik. Professionele konstruksiemense moet goed 
ingelig wees van hierdie gevolge (koste-oorskryding) op ’n vroeë stadium, ten 
einde die mate waartoe hierdie gevolge geminimaliseer kan word te evalueer.
Sleutelwoorde: Beraamde koste, bouprojekte, koste-drempeloorskryding, 
Nigerië, werklike koste
1. Introduction
The construction industry contributes to the socio-economic 
growth of any nation by improving the quality of life and providing 
infrastructures such as roads, hospitals, schools, and other basic 
facilities. Hence, it is imperative that construction projects be 
completed within the scheduled time, within the budgeted cost, and 
meet the anticipated quality. However, being a complex industry, 
it is faced with severe problems of cost overruns (Abdul-Rahman, 
Memon & Abd Karim, 2013: 268). Cost overrun is a common problem 
in both the developed and the developing nations, making it 
difficult to complete many projects within budget. Being a common 
problem, Allahaim & Liu (2012: 2) reported that cost overruns were 
found across 20 nations and five continents. Cost overruns affect 
90% of completed projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl, 2004: 7; Memon, 
2013: 1; Abdul-Rahman, Memon & Abd Karim, 2013: 268). However, 
the majority of developing countries experience overruns exceeding 
100% of the initial budget (Memon, Abdul-Rahman, Zainun & Abd 
Karim, 2013: 1970). The argument in the construction industry on how 
to reduce or totally remove cost overruns from projects has been 
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ongoing among built-environment professionals, project owners, 
and users for the past 70 years (Apolat, Alinaitwe & Tindiwensi, 
2010: 305; Allahaim & Liu, 2012: 1). There is, however, no substantial 
improvement or significant solution in mitigating its detrimental 
effects (Allahaim & Liu, 2012: 1).
Consequently, studies from different countries have revealed that 
cost overruns represent a large percentage of the production 
costs. For instance, 33.33% of the construction project owners in 
the United Kingdom are faced with the problem of cost overruns 
(Olawale & Sun, 2010: 511; Abdul-Rahman, Memon & Abd Karim, 
2013: 268). The Big Dig Central Artery/Tunnel project in Boston could 
not be completed within its budgeted cost, and it had an overrun 
of 500%. The Wembley stadium in the United Kingdom had a 50% 
cost overrun, and the Scottish parliament project, which had a time 
overrun of over three years, also experienced a cost overrun of 900% 
(Love, Edward & Irani, 2011: 7).
Over the years, research interests in addressing construction 
cost overruns across the world have resulted in a large number 
of publications. However, research evidence has shown that 
previous studies from different parts of Nigeria have centred on the 
investigation into the total amount of cost overruns for completed 
works; identification of causes of cost overruns, as well as the control 
measures for mitigating cost overruns in the construction industry 
(Ogunsemi & Jagboro, 2006: 253; Olatunji, 2008: 1; Ameh, Soyingbe 
& Odusanmi, 2010: 51; Olawale & Sun, 2010: 511; Ubani, Okorocha & 
Emeribe, 2011: 74; Kasimu, 2012: 775; Malumfashi & Shuaibu, 2012: 21). 
Nonetheless, these studies have failed to objectively investigate cost 
overrun for ongoing building projects in Nigeria. Therefore, this led to 
the development of the problem posed in this study that data on the 
amount of cost overruns for ongoing building projects are minimal in 
the Nigerian construction industry. On this basis, this article reports the 
findings of an objective investigation into cost overruns for ongoing 
building projects in Abuja, Nigeria. The recommendations of this 
paper, if properly implemented, would achieve the best value for 
money to the client, as it would encourage professionals to explore 
possible ways of minimising the rate of cost overrun on site.
2. Literature review
2.1 The concept of cost overrun in the construction industry
Cost overrun is referred to as “cost increase” or “budget overrun”. 
It involves unanticipated costs incurred in excess of the budgeted 
amounts (Shanmugapriya & Subramanian, 2013: 735). Saidu & 
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Shakantu (2016: 125) view cost overrun as simply an occurrence, 
where the final or actual cost of a project surpasses the original or 
initial estimates. Cost overrun is defined as a percentage difference 
between the final completion cost and the contract-bid cost 
(Shanmugapriya & Subramanian, 2013: 735; Shrestha, Burns & 
Shields, 2013: 2; Saidu & Shakantu, 2016: 125). Cost overrun has also 
been referred to as the percentage of actual or final costs above 
the estimated or tender cost of a project (Ubani et al., 2011: 74). 
Nega (2008: 48) defines cost overrun as an occurrence, in which the 
delivery of contracted goods/services is claimed to require more 
financial resources than was originally agreed upon between a 
project sponsor and a contractor. 
2.2 Cost overruns worldwide
The history of the construction industry worldwide abounds in 
projects that were completed with a significant amount of cost 
overrun, despite the use of modern technologies and software 
packages (Memon, 2013: 16). In the United States of America, only 
16% of the 8 000 surveyed projects in 1994 could satisfy the following 
requirements: timely completion within the budget, and maintaining 
a high standard of quality (Ameh et al., 2010: 51). In Canada, 50 road-
construction projects were investigated, and the results revealed a 
cost overrun of up to 82% in 2006 (Odeck, 2014: 71).
Cost overruns were slightly lower in Europe compared to 
North America and other geographical areas (Brunes & Lind, 
2014: 3). In the United Kingdom, Barrick revealed, in 1995, that almost 
one-third of the clients complained that their construction projects 
generally overran budget (Memon, 2013: 16).
Cantarelli, VanWee, Molin & Flyvbjerg (2012: 87) noted that the 
Dutch construction projects were reported to have an average cost 
overrun of 10.6% for railways, 18.6% for roads, and 21.7% for fixed links. 
In Portugal, construction projects face, on average, a minimum of 
12% of cost overrun (Abdul-Rahman, Memon, Abdul-Azis & Abdullah, 
2013: 1964). These results of cost overruns are not different in the 
developing countries.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Abdul-Rahman, Memon & Abd Karim 
(2013: 288) reported that, in a study of 53 building projects, 29 
new construction projects experienced a cost overrun of 6.84% on 
average, while the remaining 24 re-construction projects had a cost 
overrun of 9.23% on average. In Pakistan, the minimum amount of 
cost overrun was reported to be approximately 10% for small-sized 
firms, 40% for large construction firms, and this percentage could 
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increase to 60% for medium-sized firms (Azhar, Farooqui & Ahmed, 
2008: 506). Aziz (2013: 54) surveyed 15 different projects in Kuwait, 
and the results revealed that only one project had been completed 
without a cost overrun. Aziz (2013: 52-53) also reported that 70% 
of the building projects in Oman experienced a delay and were 
completed with cost above the initially estimated budget. 
Moreover, a study conducted on 359 projects (308 public and 51 
private projects) in Malaysia revealed that only 46.8% and 37.2% 
of public sector and private sector projects, respectively, were 
completed within the budget, with an average cost deviation of 
2.08% (Endut, Akintoye & Kolley, 2009: 244).
In Nigeria, Olawale & Sun (2010: 602) conducted a survey on cost 
overrun and found that 41% of the respondents had experienced 
a cost overrun of less than 10% of their projects, while 59% of the 
respondents had experienced a cost overrun of 10% or more on 
their projects. 
In South Africa, Baloyi & Bekker (2011: 53) reported that the 
construction of FIFA 2010 World Cup stadia in different cities was 
completed with cost overruns ranging from 5% to a maximum of 94%.
In Uganda, Apolot, Alinaitwe & Tindiwensi (2011: 310) reviewed 30 
projects of the Civil Aviation Authority of Uganda and found that 
535 of the projects, although not fully completed, experienced cost 
overruns; 40% of these projects were within the budgeted cost, and 
7% of the projects were still below the budget. A total of 84% of the 
cost overruns were occasioned by changes in the scope of the work, 
while the remainder were largely attributed to material-price inflation.
In Zambia, Kaliba, Muya & Mumba (2009: 523) revealed that road 
projects also faced over 50% of cost overruns as a result of delay and 
other factors.
2.3 Causes of cost overruns
The causes of cost overruns are critical to the success of any project 
(Allahaim & Liu, 2012: 2). Hence, it is imperative to comprehend the 
main causes of cost overruns for different projects. Therefore, cost 
overruns have been attributed to a number of sources, including 
technical errors in design or estimation; managerial incompetence; 
risks and uncertainties; suspicions of foul play; deception and 
delusion, and even corruption (Ahiaga-Dagbui & Smith, 2014: 683). 
According to Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl (2004: 7), the two main causes 
of cost overruns in a project are optimism bias (systematic tendency 
of decision-makers to be more positive about the results of planned 
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action) and strategic misrepresentations (confusing or misleading 
actions to ensure that projects succeed). Allahaim & Liu (2012: 2) 
contend that the practical causes of cost overruns are the lack of 
experience among the project team; contract size/complexity, and 
design error. Other surveys have identified the following four major 
factors that cause cost overruns for a project: variations in design; 
insufficient project planning; inclement weather conditions, and 
building materials’ price fluctuation (Allahaim & Liu, 2012: 2). Love 
et al. (2011: 7) opined that design error at the pre-contract stage 
of a project is the major cause of cost overruns for hospital and 
school buildings. 
In India, Subramani, Sruthi & Kavitha (2014: 1) surveyed the causes 
of cost overruns, and the results indicated that the major causes of 
cost overruns are slow decision-making at the planning stage of a 
project; poor project schedules and management; increases in the 
prices of materials and machines; poor contract management; poor 
design/delay in producing design; rework due to mistakes or wrong 
work; land-acquisition problems; poor estimation or estimation 
techniques, and the long time taken between the design and the 
time of bidding/tendering. 
In Egypt, Aziz (2013: 51) examined the factors causing cost overruns 
in waste-water projects and concluded that the major causes of 
cost overruns are lowest tendering procurement method; additional 
works that are not included in the original work; bureaucracy in 
tendering or offering methods; wrong cost-estimation methods, and 
funding problems by client.
In Nigeria, Ameh et al. (2010: 49) concluded that the significant 
factors causing cost overruns in the telecommunication projects 
include the contractor’s lack of experience; the high cost of importing 
materials, and the materials’ price fluctuation. Kasimu (2012: 775) 
found that “fluctuations in materials prices”, “insufficient time”, “lack 
of experience in contracts works”, and “incomplete drawings” were 
the major causes of cost overruns in building-construction projects in 
Nigeria. Malumfashi & Shuaibu (2012: 19) conducted a study on the 
causes of cost overruns in the infrastructural projects in Nigeria. The 
results revealed that the major causes include “improper planning”; 
“material-price fluctuations”, and “inadequate finance from the 
project’s inception”.
In South Africa, Baloyi & Bekker (2011: 61) conducted a study on the 
causes of cost overruns for the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadia. The results 
revealed that the main causes of cost overruns are project complexity; 
increases in labour costs; inaccurate quantity estimations; differences 
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between the selected bid and the consultants’ estimates; variation 
orders by clients during construction, and manpower shortage.
In Zambia, Kaliba et al. (2009: 524) concluded that the problem of 
cost overruns was caused by inclement weather conditions; changes 
in the size of projects; the cost of environmental sustainability; delays 
in the work programme; civil unrest; technical constraints, and 
increases in material prices.
Other studies have identified a variety of causes of cost overruns, 
including technical factors such as the lack of experience; the 
project size; errors in design; price fluctuations; wrong estimates, and 
scope changes (Love et al., 2011: 6; Memon et al., 2011: 59).
2.4 Mitigation measures for cost overruns
Project cost overrun is minimised and mitigated when maximum 
attention is paid to well-developed technical skills in modern 
projects (Doloi, 2013: 267). Olawale & Sun (2010: 513) noted that a 
critical investigation into cost overrun mitigation measures would 
result in their categorisation according to the broad function they 
perform. Thus, Olawale & Sun (2010: 513) identified the top five 
leading causes of cost overrun for a project and recommend a 
total of 90 mitigation measures for them. These mitigation measures 
were further categorised into four major classes, namely preventive, 
predictive, corrective, and organisational. Some of these measures 
(categories) are fluid and can sometimes appear as though they 
could be classified into more than one category, depending on their 
actual usage during the project. They include corrective-preventive 
and corrective-predictive measures.
Similarly, Abdul-Azis, Memon, Abdul Rahmann & Abd Karim 
(2013: 2627) identified and categorised cost overrun mitigation 
strategies into three major classes, namely proactive, reactive 
and organisational strategies. The proactive and organisational 
approaches are similar or almost the same as the preventive 
and organisational measures recommended by Olawale & Sun 
(2010: 513). The reactive strategies, however, are adopted to mitigate 
the effect of the factor that actively contributes to cost overruns, 
while the organisational strategies are the normal measures put in 
place by an organisation, which must not be specific to one project, 
but would normally affect all projects. Some of these measures are 
classified in more than one strategy. For instance, proactive and 
organisational; reactive and organisational; pro-active and reactive, 
as well as pro-active, reactive, and organisational-control measures. 
The issues in each control measure are detailed in Figure 1. 









Re-active Measure: Organisational Measures:• Effective strategic planning
• Project planning and 
scheduling
• Effective site management 
and supervision
• Systematic control 
mechanism
• Use of appropirate 
construction methods
• Use of up-to-date 
technology




planning of project 
tasks and resources
• Frequent coordination 
between parties
• Human resource 
development in the 
construction industry
• Comprehensive contract 
administration
• Emphasis on past experience
• Use of experienced 
subcontractors and suppliers
• Improving contract award 
procedure by giving less weight 
to prices and more weight 
to the capabilities and past 
performance of contractors
• Frequent progess meetings
Figure 1: Cost overrun factors from each mitigation measure
Source: Researcher’s construct adapted from Abdul-Azis et al., 2013
Flyvbjerg (2008: 6-7) suggested two main concepts for minimising 
the cost overruns on construction projects, namely reference-class 
forecasting and increased public sector accountability through 
more involvement by the private parties.
Brunes & Lind (2014: 5) suggested three key areas on how cost 
overruns could be reduced in a project:
decentralization of budgets, where cost overruns in one project 
in a region lead to less cost overruns in other projects in the 
specific region … It should be easy to see when and where cost 
overruns occur, and who was primarily responsible … ensuring 
a systematic use of external reviewers at the different stages of 
a project.
Peeters & Madauss (2008: 81) recommend a five-step approach 
to mitigating the effects of cost overruns in a project: realistic cost 
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estimation; considering the project’s life-cycle cost; appropriate 
contractual framework; cost control and risk management during 
the project phase, and a communication-managed insurance 
approach. Memon et al. (2013: 1970) concluded that site-
management factors are the important factors causing cost overrun. 
They thus suggest that improved site management and supervision 
of contractors could result in better control of cost overruns. In 
conclusion, the magnitude of the cost overrun was reduced after 
a mandatory quality assurance process was introduced in Norway 
(Magnussen & Olsson, 2006: 286). 
3. Research methodology
The mode of inquiry in this research is the quantitative method that 
is rooted in the positivist research paradigm, because the data were 
generated from the numeric measurement of the estimated costs of 
projects, estimated time and actual time for projects, estimated cost 
and actual costs of work completed, as well as the amount of cost 
overrun for each project.
The study covers “ongoing” building-construction projects in Abuja, 
the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria, from which a sample of 
30 projects was selected. The sample comprised both public and 
private projects, with a value of 1.6 billion Naira/ZAR100 million and 
above, using purposive sampling techniques. The rationale for the 
selection of purposive sampling is that building-construction projects 
of ZAR100 million and above are likely to generate a huge amount of 
cost overruns, when compared with projects of less value. In addition, 
it is possible to have more experts (experienced professionals) than in 
smaller sized/lower valued projects.
Abuja was selected as the geographical case-study area, because it 
is one of the metropolitan cities in Nigeria with the highest population 
of professionals within the built environment, and many ongoing 
construction projects. This study focused mainly on the primary data, 
which included the archival records and project progress records in 
Abuja, Nigeria.
3.1 Projects’ archival and progress records
The data on Estimated Cost of project (EC), Estimated Time for project 
(ET), Cost Now/actual cost (CN), and Time Now/actual time (TN), 
the percentage of the Work Completed (%ofWC), the Estimated 
Cost of the Work Completed (ECWC), and the Actual Cost of Work 
Completed (ACWC) for different projects were all collected from the 
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archival records (bills of quantities, specifications, and drawings) and 
the project-progress records compiled by the Quantity Surveyor for 
individual projects. The collected values of “ACWC” were deducted/
subtracted from the values of “ECWC” to determine the project’s 
cost overruns. The percentage amount of cost overrun for each 
project was determined by dividing the amount of cost overrun by 
the estimated cost of work completed and multiplied by 100. 
3.2 Data analyses
Both descriptive and inferential analyses of the data were employed 
in this study. The descriptive analysis included the percentage 
distributions (percentage amount of cost overruns for each project). 
This included describing and comparing the percentages of cost 
overrun to the percentages of work completed for projects. The linear 
regression (inferential) analysis available from the Statistica software 
package was performed to determine the relationships between the 
following variables: Estimated Time (x) and Actual Time (y) of projects; 
Estimated cost (x) and Actual cost (y) of projects; Percentage of work 
completed (x) and amount of cost overruns (y), as shown in Table 2. 
The results of this research are presented in tabular form.
The linear-regression equation was used to determine the relationship 
between the variables.




Where “y” is the dependent variable (Volume of waste); “x” is the 
independent variable (volume of material used); “b” is the coefficient 
of “x” and “a” is a constant. 
The approximate conversion rates used as at the period of data 
collection were: Nigerian Naira to US dollar = ₦200 = 1USD; Nigerian 
Naira to South African Rand = ₦16 = ZAR1.
For the purpose of anonymity, the names of the firms and the 
projects are not disclosed in this research, but are represented by 
project numbers.
4. Results and discussion
It is apparent from Table 1 that all the building projects visited 
had attained an average percentage completion of 52.4%. 
Approximately 15 out of the 30 projects were 50% completed and 
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only seven were 90%-99.9% completed, because the constructions 
were ongoing as at the period of data collection. These findings are 
reliable, because the average percentage of project completion is 
above 50%.
Moreover, research results from Table 1 also show that the percentage 
amount of cost overruns ranges from a minimum of 5.56% up to 90% 
project completion, and within 88% of the estimated time limit. This 
rose to a maximum of 216.08% with merely 5% project completion, 
and within 8.3% of the estimated time limit. All the projects had an 
average cost overrun of 44.46%, with an average project completion 
of 52.4%, and within an average estimated time limit of 91.4%. These 
results confirm the findings of Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl (2004: 7); Ameh 
et al. (2010: 49-53); Memon (2013: 1-3), and Abdul-Rahman, Memon 
& Abd Karim (2013: 268) that cost overrun is a common problem in 
the construction industry, because a huge amount of cost overrun 
has been noticed in a project with merely 5% completion.




































































































































1 3,200,000 24 11 17% 544,000 800,000 256,000 47.06%
2 14,000,000 24 15 47% 6,580,000 8,540,000 1,960,000 29.79%
3 1,650,000 20 36 59% 973,500 1,155,000 181,500 18.64%
4 6,000,000 24 12 35% 2,100,000 2,400,000 300,000 14.29%
5 5,880,000 22.5 54 43% 2,528,400 3,609,400 1,081,000 42.75%
6 1,800,000 16 11 63% 1,134,000 1,632,321 498,321 43.94%
7 15,900,782 36 13 30% 4,770,235 5,678,313 908,079 19.04%
8 7, 300,000 24 32 30% 2,190,000 3,285,000 1,095,000 50.00%
9 1, 800,000 24 21 68% 1,224,000 1,681,100 457,100 37.35%
10 6, 000,000 24 16 23% 1,380,000 1,800,000 420,000 30.44%
11 1, 650,000 24 23 65% 1,072,500 1,451,300 378,800 35.32%
12 1, 900,000 18 9 25% 475,000 600,000 125,000 26.32%
13 2, 580,333 18 7 15% 387,050 5,805,745 193,525 50.00%





































































































































14 40,000,000 36 3 5% 2,000,000 6,321,562 4,321,562 216.08
15 20,940,557 48 19 17% 3,559,895 5,152,850 1,592,955 44.75%
16 3,450,000 24 11 23% 793,500 1,293,512 500,012 63.01%
17 1,666,346 18 8 31% 516,567 833,732 317,165 61.40%
18 2,300,000 24 10 25% 575,000 805,000 230,000 40.00%
19 2,300,000 24 21 90% 2,070000 2,185,000 115,000 5.56%
20 15,031,448 40 5 11% 1,653,459 1,935,632 282,173 17.07%
21 1,880,000 20 14 48% 902,400 1,534,000 631,600 69.70%
22 1,686,921 17 39 99.9% 1,670,052 3,100,000 1,429,949 85.62%
23 1,635,000 24 18 56% 944,693 1,265,324 320,631 33.94%
24 1,800,000 26 16 68% 1,224,000 1,364,562 140,562 11.48%
25 1,686,951 24 54 99.9% 1,670,082 2,700,000 1,029,918 61.67%
26 1,700,000 68 92 60% 1,020,000 1,360,000 340,000 33.33%
27 2,860,000 24 36 88% 2,516,800 3,162,831 646,031 25.67%
28 2,635,001 18 21 95% 2,503,251 2,985,333 482,082 19.27%
29 1,931,622 24 24 98% 1,892,989 2,161,313 268,324 14.18%
30 63,000,000 60 96 90% 56000,000 62,333,222 5,333,222 9.52%




The result of the linear-regression analysis for 52.4% average project 
completion reveals the following.
It was observed from analysis No. 1 (relationship between the 
‘estimated time’ and the ‘actual time’ of projects) that the probability 
value (0.000355) was less than the 0.05 (5%) significance level, and an 
R-square value of 37.08%. Therefore, it is inferred that the relationship 
was statistically significant. The result implies that, on average, the 
actual completion times (months) for projects are moving in line with 
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the estimated times. This result differs for some individual projects, as 
further explained in Tables 3 and 5.
Analysis No. 2 (relationship between the ‘estimated cost of work 
completed’ and the ‘actual cost of work completed’) revealed 
a statistical significant relationship between the variables with a 
probability value of 0.00000 less than the 0.05 (5%) significance 
level, and a very strong R-square value of 98.9%. This implies that, on 
average, the ‘actual costs of work completed’ are in line with the 
‘estimated costs of work completed’ for all the projects. However, 
this is different for some individual projects, as further explained in 
Table 1.
Analysis No. 3 (relationship between the ‘percentage of work 
completed’ and the ‘amount of cost overrun’) shows that the 
evidence is not statistically significant, because the probability 
value (0.854496) was greater than the 0.05 (5%) significance level. 
This implies that the ‘amount of cost overruns’ does not necessarily 
depend on the ‘percentage of the work completed’. In other words, 
cost overrun could occur at an early stage of a project with a small 
percentage of project completion. This result is further explained in 
Table 3.






x y R square
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regression 0.122% 0.021231 0.0349 0.854496
Not 
significant
4.2 Building projects that have high cost overruns of 50% and 
above
Table 3 shows the results of the projects that have high cost overruns 
(50% and above). It is obvious from Table 3 that Pn14 recorded a 
maximum of 216.08% cost overrun with merely 5% completion, and 
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within the first three months of the project commencement. This could 
not be as a result of delay, because the project was not delayed 
in any way, but could be occasioned by other factors such as 
mismanagement of resources, poor planning, or even corruption.
Both Pn22 and Pn25 had an additional 22 and 20 months, respectively, 
to attain 99.9% completion level. They recorded a cost overrun of 
85.62% and 61.67%, respectively. These could have been as a result 
of extension of time and other related factors. However, Pn8, which 
was to be completed within 24 months, instead took an additional 
eight months, was only 30% completed, and had a cost overrun 
of 50%. 


















Pn8 24 32 +8 30% 50%
Pn13 18 9 -9 15% 50%
Pn14 36 3 -33 5% 216.08%
Pn16 24 11 -13 23% 63.01%
Pn17 18 8 -10 31% 61.40%
Pn21 20 14 -6 48% 69.70%
Pn22 17 39 +22 99.9% 85.62%
Pn25 24 54 +20 99.9% 61.67%
4.3 Building projects that have ‘low percentage of work 
completed’ and ‘high cost overruns’ 
It is apparent from Table 4 that Pn14 had the highest cost overrun 
(216.08%), and that only 5% of the work was completed within the first 
three months of the estimated 36 months. Moreover, both Pn1 and 
Pn15 had percentage completion of 17%. They were both within their 
estimated time limits (13 and 29 months left), but had cost overruns 
of 47.06% and 44.75%, respectively. Pn13, which had only 15% rate of 
completion had a cost overrun of up to 50%. This implies that, unless 
the management of the projects is tight, these projects can continue 
to overrun their initial budget.
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Table 4: Projects that have ‘low percentage of work completed’ 



















Pn15 48 19 +29 17% 44.75%
Pn14 36 3 +33 5% 216.08%
Pn1 24 11 +13 17% 47.06%
Pn13 18 7 +11 15% 50%
4.4 Building projects that have ‘high percentage of work 
completed’ and ‘low cost overruns’
It is clear from Table 5 that Pn25, which was 90% completed, had the 
lowest cost overrun of 5.56%, although the project had an extension 
of 30 months. This is followed by Pn30, which was 90% completed, had 
an extension of 33 months, and recorded a cost overrun of 9.25%. 
These percentage amounts of cost overrun could probably have 
been as a result of the extension of time and other related factors.
Moreover, Pn24 was 68% completed, had a cost overrun of 11.48%, 
and the project is still within its normal estimated time limit (10 
months left). However, Pn29, which was almost completed (98%) 
within the estimated time limit, also had a cost overrun of 14.18%. 
Pn28, which had a cost overrun of 19.27%, had an additional three 
months’ extension to be completed at 95%. These results confirm 
the findings of Ameh et al. (2010: 49-53) who believed that the 
history of the construction industry worldwide abounds in projects 
that are completed with significant cost overruns. Despite the high 
percentage of work being completed, these projects still recorded 
low amounts of cost overruns between 5.56% and 19.25%.
Table 5: Projects that have ‘high percentage of work completed’ 















Pn30 60 96 -36 90% 9.25%
Pn29 24 24 0 98% 14.18%
Pn28 18 21 -3 95% 19.27%
Pn24 26 16 +10 68% 11.48%
Pn25 24 54 -30 90% 5.56%
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5. Conclusion and recommendations 
Estimating the amount of cost overrun at different stages of a 
construction project is important, but the total amount of cost overrun 
can only be determined once a project is completed. The dearth of 
research that determines the amount of cost overruns for ongoing 
building projects necessitated this study. The aim of this research was 
to report the results of cost overruns for ongoing building projects in 
Abuja, Nigeria.
The relationship between the ‘estimated time’ and the ‘actual time’ 
and ‘estimated cost’ and the ‘actual cost’ of projects was statistically 
significant. The results imply that, on average, the actual completion 
times (months) and the actual cost for projects are moving in line 
with the estimated times and the estimated costs, respectively, 
although the results differ for some individual projects that recorded 
high cost overruns. Conversely, the relationship between the 
‘percentage of work completed’ and the ‘amount of cost overrun’ 
was not statistically significant. This implies that the ‘amount of cost 
overruns’ does not necessarily depend on the ‘percentage level of 
the work completed’ to occur. In other words, cost overrun could 
occur at an early stage of a project with a small percentage of 
project completion.
The results also revealed that the percentage amount of cost overruns 
ranged from a minimum of 5.56% with 90% project completion, and 
within 88% of the estimated time limit, to a maximum of 216.08% with 
merely 5% project completion, and within 8.3% of the estimated 
time limit. The projects had an average cost overrun of 44.46%, 
with average project completion of 52.4%, and within the average 
estimated time limit of 91.4%. 
The projects that had high cost overruns ranged from a minimum of 
50% to a maximum of 216.08%. Similarly, the project that had high 
percentage completion and low cost overruns ranged from the 
minimum of 44.75% cost overrun, with 17% completion to a maximum 
of 216.08% cost overrun, with 5% completion. However, the projects 
that had a high percentage of completion time and low cost overruns 
ranged from a minimum of 5.56% cost overrun, with 90% completion 
to a maximum of 19.27% cost overrun, with 95% completion. Based 
on these findings, it can be concluded that continuous investigation 
and analyses of cost overruns at stages of building projects would 
encourage professionals to apply the best mitigation measures, in 
order to achieve a significant reduction in the total cost overrun 
upon completion of a project.
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It is recommended that construction professionals be well informed 
of these consequences at an early stage of a project, in order to 
enable them to evaluate the extent to which these consequences 
could be minimised.
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